INTRODUCTION
The events of 9/11 brought a new focus to the vulnerability of the US economy to attack from malevolent forces. As the world globalized and technology advanced in leaps and bounds over the last two decades, new infrastructures emerged -in addition to the roads, rail, and power networks, fiber optic grids connecting computers became vital to a new information econo my. The new interconnectedness of the globe and pervasiveness of information technologies, that enabled an economic revolution, are also now the tools that terrorists can use to attack the United States and its economy. The dependence of the new economy on information has made the infrastructures that supply it critical to the functioning and stability of the nation. The new infrastructures of telecommunications and IT are "inherently spatial" (Falk and Abler 1980; Gillespie and Robins 1989) . Communication systems that lie at the heart of telecommunications and IT compress time and space, reducing, if not eliminating, the effects of distance (Atkinson 1998; Brunn and Leinbach 1991; Cairncross 1997; Castells 1989; Negroponte 1995) . The "death of distance" (Cairncross 1997 ) has led to wide speculation across many disciplines that the IT and telecommunications revolution would be an end to the "tyranny of geography" (Gillespie and Robins 1989) .
This disassociation of location has led to the common conception that the Internet and IT are virtual entities residing in cyberspace. This same conception has resulted in a belief that security issues for the Internet and IT reside solely in cyberspace as well.
While cyber-security concerns such as denial of service attacks, identity theft, and various other forms of hacking are serious security threats, they are not the only danger to the US information infrastructure. The Internet and IT depend on physical fiber to connect the various computers, servers, switches, and routers that provide the underpinnings of the US information infrastructure. All of these vital components have a physical location, but since the US information infrastructure is privately owned and proprietary these locations are most often undisclosed. As a result there is no current map of the US information infrastructure (Internetweek 2001) . Without an aggregated network to map there is no process by which to determine if the network is susceptible to a targeted physical attack, and if so what nodes and links are most vital.
Current security mandates state that the telecommunications infrastructure is densely connected and that physical attack is unlikely to disrupt the network for extended periods of time (NRC 2002 , NSTAC 2002 . While this assertion could be largely true for any one individual network, the susceptibility to attack of the interconnection of the mass of networks comprising the information infrastructure remains to be validated. Empirical evidence has illustrated a high order of attack susceptibility for the interconnected router infrastructure of the Internet (Albert et al 2000 , Callaway et al 2000 , Cohen et al 2001 .
The average performance of the Internet would be cut in half if just 1% of the most highly connected routers were incapacitated and loses its integrity with 4% of the most connected routers destroyed. Where are these top 1% and top 4% of routers? Are they distributed enough that a coordinated attack would be infeasible? Are the back up systems and redundancy of private providers sufficient to compensate for these susceptibilities? These are just the first order of questions about the susceptibility of critical infrastructure to attack. Further areas of investigation include the dependencies of other critical infrastructures (finance and banking, electric power etc.) on information networks. Also how can cyber-attacks be used in conjunction with attacks on physical infrastructure to compound damage for greater ripple effects in the economy?
This study is intended to begin to explore some of these issues. Through mathematical and spatial analyses the study will attempt to gain a better understanding of the topology and structure of our nation's complex telecommunications infrastructurei.e., where the " critical" nodes and links are located in this network, and how the performance of the network is affected by the removal of certain nodes or links. The findings of this analysis will be used to derive a set of policy and planning recommendations on how best to mitigate the catastrophic and cascading effects that could occur as the result of a targeted physical and/or cyber attack on the nation's telecommunications infrastructure. In order to fully understand the implications of the issues addressed in this study and to identify related research efforts across various disciplines, the relevant literatures are next discussed. This survey will briefly cover research of geographic networks and complexity research involving networks. Following the literature review a methodology will be presented for vulnerability analysis of information networks and also an approach to fusing these operational networks with physical networks they run over for analysis. Lastly, the results of the analysis will be placed in the context of national and regional security and economic impact.
GEOGRAPHIC NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
The most prominent aspect of the telecommunications and information revolution is its ability, through phenomena like the Internet and satellite trans missions; to connect geographically separated locations (that posses the appropriate technology levels). There has been an increased attention of the spatial aspects of communications, but they have often overlooked the foundations of the spatial analysis of networks. Social science and specifically geography has a deep tradition in network and spatial analysis. Garrison and Marble (1962) did in-depth network analysis on the interstate highway system, analyzing the importance of nodes and links on location and development. This same vein of research was greatly expanded through Garrison's student Kansky (1963) and later with the work of Chorley and Haggett (1968) . In addition, Nyusten and Dacey (1968) and later Taafee and Gauthier (1973) Specifically, examination of the backbone level of the Internet is an area that has enjoyed a significant level of analysis by geographers, planners, policy analysts, and regional economists (Wheeler and O'Kelly 1999 , Moss and Townsend 2000 , Gorman and Malecki 2000 , Malecki and Gorman 2001 , Grubesic and O'Kelly 2002 , Townsend 2001 , Choi et al 2001 , Pelletiere and Rodrigo 2001 . The findings of this research have been remarkably consistent. Backbone networks disproportionately agglomerate in the largest metropolitan areas, "The critical importance of access to new technologies has highlighted the characteristic diffusion pattern: hierarchical -beginning first in large cities, where the largest markets are found, and then to progressively smaller places (Malecki 1999) ". These large markets cluster spatially into distinct groups like the Boston-Washington corridor and the LA-San Francisco complex that are fully interconnected to each other both by the telephone network (Langdale 1983) and the Internet backbones (Gorman and Malecki 1999; Moss and Townsend 1998; Wheeler and O'Kelly 1999) . The result is that the spatial hierarchy of the United States is unique; the coasts are more connected to each other than they are to the interior of the country -the coasts are the core and the interior is the periphery (Gorman and Malecki 2000) .
Statistical analysis has produced a very distinct profile for these highly connected hub cities. Leading cities in advanced telecommunication services have been found to have high concentrations of producer services, financial service (FIRE), low levels of manufacturing, high population, and high total personal income (McIntee 2001 , Malecki 2000 , Gorman and McIntee 2001 , Leyshon 1996 , Warf 1995 , Graham 1999 . Further, these cities are predominantly world cities that serve as hubs for information services as well as serving a command and control functions for global firms (Know and Taylor 1995 , Friedmann and Wolf 1982 , Townsend 2001 , Malecki 2002 .
The profile of these super-connected cities also influences the structure of the network at a micro level within the city. Longcore and Rees' (1996) examination of New York City's financial district demonstrates meaningful analysis of information technology and networks at a very local level. They found that in New York the historic Wall Street-centered financial district has had to disperse within the city to take advantage of buildings and real estate with sufficient built-in infrastructure and technology to handle the district's specialized role in the information economy. Without buildings lit by fiber optic connections financial district firms were disconnected from the global economy.
Network analysis of the spatial networks of the Internet has only begun to be investigated. Wheeler and O'Kelly (1999) examined the basic graph measures of several domestic US providers and analysis of city connectivity of the aggregated providers. Gorman and Malecki (2000) investigated the network topologies of several firms and how graph theoretic measures could be used to investigate competitive advantage and the nature of interconnection between networks. Later studies have looked at the structure of networks and city connectivity as a time series finding large changes in bandwidth capacity (Malecki 2002 , Townsend 2001 , but little cha nge in graph measures of connectivity (O'Kelly and Grubesic 2002) . While connectivity indices have changed little over time the overall structure of the network has - found that the aggregated US backbone network has increasing self-organized from 1997 to 2000 creating a more efficient but more sparsely connected network. This research confirmed at a spatial level of analysis what was being found at a topological level in the study of complex networks.
COMPLEXITY OF TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Telecommunications networks are large and complex, and the study of complex networks has enjoyed a flurry of new findings in the last few years. The basis on studying large networks is built upon the work of Erdos and Renyi (ER). Erdos and Renyi (ER) endeavored to use "probabilistic methods" to solve problems in graph theory where a large number of nodes where involved (Albert and Barabasi 2002, p. 54) . Under this assumption they modeled large graphs utilizing algorithms where N nodes were randomly c onnected according to probability P, and found that when vertices were connected in this fashion they followed a Poisson distribution (Albert and Barabasi 2002, p 49) . A more thorough review of random graphs can be found in the survey work of Bollobas (1985) .
The absence of detailed topological data for complex networks left random network models as the most widely used method of network simulation (Barabasi 2001 ).
Watts and Strogatz (WS)(1998) using several large data sets found that complex networks were not entirely random but instead displayed significant clustering at the local level. Further, that local clusters linked across the graph to each other forming "small worlds". These short cuts across the graph to different clusters of vertices introduced a level of efficiency not predicted in the ER model and showed the first signs of selforganization in complex networks. The distribution was not Poisson as with the ER model, but was bounded and decayed exponentially for large sets of vertices. These findings spurred a flurry of work into the attributes of complex networks and new findings and discoveries quickly followed. In 1998 two parallel studies by Barabasi, Reka, and Jeong of Notre Dame and Huberman and Adamic at Parc Xerox found that when one looks at the World Wide Web as a graph (web pages are vertices and hyperlinks connecting them are edges) it followed not a Poisson or exponential distribution, but a power law distribution.
A power law is a significantly different finding from eithe r the expected exponential or Poisson distribution. In a power law distribution there is an abundance of nodes with only a few links, and a small but significant minority that have very large number of links (Barabasi 2001) . This is a distinct difference from both the ER and WS model that should be noted; the probability of finding a highly connected vertex in the ER and WS model decreases exponentially, thus vertices with high connectivity are practically absent . The reason, according to Barabasi and Albert, was that complex networks were not static; the number of nodes does not stay constant as in the WS and ER model. Complex networks grow over time and new vertices attach preferentially to already well-connected vertices in the network Barabasi and Albert (1999) 2. Preferential connectivity -Preferential connectivity expresses the frequently encountered phenomenon that there is higher probability for a new or existing node to connect or reconnect to a node that already has a large number of links (i.e. high vertex degree) than there is to (re)connect to a low degree vertex.
3. Re-wiring -Re-wiring allows for some additional flexibility in the formation of networks by removing links connected to certain nodes and replacing them with new links in a way that effectively amounts to a local type of re-shuffling connection based of preferential attachment. corollaries need to be made (Chen et al 2001) . The re-wiring principle was one response to these criticisms, but overall the model has held (Albert and Barabasi 2000) . Tests of network generators based on power laws have been found to produce better models and efforts are being made to base new Internet protocols on these discoveries (Tangmunarunkit et al 2001 , Radoslavov et al 2001 . While these discoveries have paved the way for advancements in several fields the question of the geography and location of these networks remain to be addressed.
ERROR AND ATTACK TOLERANCE OF COMPLEX NETWORKS
Scale free networks have many implications, but a far-reaching consequence of their unique structure is they are very fault tolerant but also susceptible to attack (Albert et al 2000) . Research done at the Notre Dame Center on Self Organizing Networks found that a scale free network model remains connected when up to 80% of nodes are randomly removed from the network. On the other hand, when the most connected nodes are removed the diameter of the network increases rapidly, doubling its original value if the top 5% of nodes are removed. This work was confirmed by the analysis of Callaway et al (2000) modeling network robustness and fragility as a percolation and by Cohen et al (2001) . This work was extended to demonstrate that scale-free dynamical networks have the same robust and fragile properties under synchronization. Preliminary analyses of these models on spatial network data have shown similar results when cities are the nodes and fiber connections between them are the links (Gorman and Kulkarni 2002) .
Utilizing a different model of node connectivity and path availability Grubesic et al (forthcoming) find that the disconnection of a major hub city can cause the disconnection of peripheral cities from the network. Spatial analysis of network failure has also been done for airline networks finding similar results for the Indian airline network (Cliff et al 1979) . These findings have profound implications for telecommunications networks that have scale free properties.
METHODOLOGY
In order to test the susceptibility of the spatial US information infrastructure to attack several approaches w ere developed building upon prior studies and literature.
Several studies have noted that the removal of critical nodes caused a rapid degradation of the network. Generally, these nodes are determined to be critical based on their level of connectivity, often referred to as an accessibility index in spatial network analysis.
The first methodological step of this study was to determine which nodes are most critical and what is the best way to identify these nodes. The next step is to test the set of nodal hierarchies and see which ranking method has the greatest impact on the network when nodes are targeted for failure and what the ripple effect of their removal is. Lastly, an attempt will be made develop analysis that will allow the modeling of physical fiber networks with logical (operational) networks. This approach will allow some understanding of the impact a cut or failure in the physical network will have on the logical network. Data will be analyzed for each step of the methodology and conclusio ns will be drawn.
Nodal Hierarchies
There are several approaches to establishing nodal hierarchies within a network, and classical spatial network analysis has some standard approaches. The most common of which is the accessibility index:
The accessibility index provides the number of connections to a node; in the case of this study each MSA is considered a node. Another derivation of the accessibility index is to look at not only the binary connectivity of a node, but also the capacity of those links:
c = capacity of the link
While both of these approaches to nodal hierarchies provide useful insight into connectivity there are some drawbacks. These nodal hierarchies are based on some fundamental assumptions:
1. There are a certain number of discrete-classes of settlements.
2. The number of settlements in each size class increases down the hierarchy. 14 3. There is some characteristic spacing between nearest neighbors at any particular level.
(Lo we and Moryadas 1975)
The drawback of this approach is that it is based on a spatial-hierarchical structuring of an idealized Loschian landscape. In a Loschian landscape nodes will connect and goods will flow based on proximity with larger places connecting to each other through intervening smaller places (Hagget 1966 ). This approach is based on a planar network, where the intersection of any two links results in a node. Information networks, though, are non-planar constructs where two distant places can be directly connected without intervening nodes being transited. As a result traditional methods of determining nodal hierarchies might not be appropriate. 
Note that, since m is the last region in the block diagonal matrix, its global connections have already been computed in the previous m-1 blocks.
The total number of local connections L is a sum over all the local connections over m regions and is given by:
Then the global connectivity index for a node i in region r is given by: 
The simulations produced the graph seen in figure 2 , where the x-axis is the increments of D tested and the y-axis is the percentage of nodes with a global to local ration greater than one. Figure 2 shows a sharp shift somewhere before 500 miles. To find the exact point of inflection the rate of change in the global to local ration was calculated, as illustrated in figure 3 . The rate of change graph clearly points to 300 miles as being the point of inflection. Under such an assumption all links shorter than 300 miles are considered local and all links over 300 miles are considered global. Interestingly 300 miles is very close to the mean distance of all links in the matrix, 308.6 miles. Further, the average length of private leased lines (a different set of data) in the United States is 300 miles (Coffman and Odlyzko 1999). The recurring nature of 300 miles could point to a common spatial structure in the United States for communication networks. This is an area that merits further investigation and possible cross-country comparisons.
Another hierarchy was developed based on the distance small world approach looks at just the number of global connections a node has, and ranks them based on that count. The equation would then be:
This ranking would provide an indicator of how many long haul global connections a city has. The hypothesis being that the more global connections the greater the impact the loss of the node will have in connecting various clusters across the network. A final approach considered for this study is to identify relay nodes and what effect they have on the survivability of the network. Relay nodes are typically defined as locations that are neither the ultimate origin nor destination of an interaction across a network.
The primary purpose of a relay node is to receive flows in order to transmit them to another node with minimum delay and cost (Lowe and Moryadas 1975) 
Where c ij = capacity and b ij = business demand This approach provides a rough indicator of how much built capacity exceeds the consumption of capacity dictated by demand. It is assumed that nodes with an aggregate disproportionate amount of excess capacity are using it to relay information to other destination nodes. The hypothesis for a relay node hierarchy is that these nodes are structurally important in linking up large destination nodes and without them connection would be severely affected.
With a series of nodal ranking approaches designed, a data set is needed to apply them to. For this study a 2000 dataset of aggregated IP network providers was used comprising of a matrix of 147 metropolitan statistical areas and the IP bandwidth available between each one (Malecki 2001 In order to test these nodal hierarchies with the datasets outlined above each rankorder was run through two simulations. In the first simulation each node was successively removed according to its rank and the diameter of the network was measured for each removal. The diameter of the network is the minimum number of hops it takes to get from the two furthest nodes on the network. Mathematically this is The results of both the diameter and S-I index analysis can be found in table 2.
The diameter results are the easiest to interpret and reveal some interesting findings. The hierarchies with the largest effect on the diameter of the network were the small world distance hierarchy and the global hierarchy, both of which ended is a diameter of 16 when the top 15 nodes (roughly 10%) were removed. The starting diameter of the network in each case was 7 and the result of 16 was more than a doubling of the diameter, meaning it took more than twice the number of hops to reach the two furthest places on the network. This results in a ripple effect across the network where it will take a minimum of twice the time to get from any point to another. This does not take into account the capacity of the links removed and how traffic will be redistributed across the network. This is an area of ongoing research based on this study. While both hierarchies end up at 16 the global hierarchy accelerates more rapidly in the beginning while the small world distance hierarchy accelerates the diameter more quickly at the end of the nodal hierarchy.
The next group of nodal hierarchies was the relay node and small world regional hierarchy which both end with a diameter of 12. Finally, the binary and bandwidth capacity hierarchy had the least impact each ending in a diameter of 10.
The diameter relationship of the hierarchies is seen more clearly when all the nodal hierarchies are plotted with their diameters at each successive node removal ( figure   4 ). The lower impact of the binary and bandwidth hierarchy are very evident up to roughly the fifteenth node removal, when the diameter starts to vary erratically first for small world distance then global and finally small world regional. The decrease in diameter results from the network Balkanizing into two or more sub-graphs. The subgraph is a smaller subset of the whole network and thus has a lower diameter. This is a significant juncture because individual places are no longer just being disconnected, but entire islands of nodes are being created, signifying a catastrophic failure of the network.
Further, the bottom placement of the binary connectivity hierarchy is of note since this is the method by which nodes have been chosen for removal in the majority of studies in the literature (Albert et al 2000 , Callaway et al 2000 , Cohen et al 2001 . This would appear to indicate that the most critical nodes in the network are not the most obvious ones, and judging nodes by only the agglomeration of links is not a sufficient method for examining the susceptibility of spatial networks. The study does reveal that incorporating distance into an analysis of critical nodes for network survivability produces significantly improved results. Finally, when it comes to the survivability of the Internet distance is hardly dead.
An examination of the S-I index confirms the findings of the diameter analysis. The vast majority of this capacity remains unused or is allocated to private leased lines.
In fact, if you take the top twenty US cities and average how much lit bandwidth is used for the Internet it is only 1.37% of the total (based on Telegeography 2002) . While the Internet is a small percentage of total capacity it is a much larger percentage of traffic averaging 2,500-4000 TB a month compared to 3,000-5,000 TB a month for private lines developed by Bhandari (1999) , where a logical network is overlaid on the physical network it runs over. In this graph theoretical construct a new terminology is added, spans and span nodes. Spans are the actual physical links that comprise the network and logical links are built from these spans. Thus, a given span can be common to a number of links, and several spans can combine to form a single logical link (Bhandari 1999) .
Once a physical and logical network is combined there are logical links and nodes and span links and nodes. This approach makes more sense when illustrated visually. Figure 6 is the physical fiber network for Genuity and Figure 7 is the logical IP network that runs over the physical fiber network. Figure 8 illustrates the combination of the physical fiber and operational IP network into one map.
The goal of physical disjoint analysis is to examine these two network as graphs and determine how many physically disjoint paths exist between any two places on the network. Thus, if there were a physical fiber cut would there be another physical path for the data to follow to arrive at its destination. Mathematically the edge disjointness (ED)
for a pair of paths can be defined as:
Where the j sum is over the common edges of the two paths and the i sum is over the edges of the two paths. This approach becomes clearer when framed as a visual example.
In the Genuity example above how many physically disjoint paths are there between San This analysis has also put forward a preliminary method of analyzing the interactions of physical and logical networks. Utilizing the concept of spans from Bhandari (1999) it is possible perform physical disjoint analysis and determine the impact of physical fiber cuts on a logical network. The approach was extended to allow an overall system analysis to determine the criticality of physical links to the operation of a logical network. This allows vulnerability analysis of operational networks and the private line infrastructure they are dependent on at both a micro and macro level. This is a first step in analyzing the interdependencies of various information networks (financial, military, aviation, energy) and the fiber infrastructure they are dependent on.
Applying the analysis of this paper to create public policy recommendations prove s to be a difficult task. 
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